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The game’s not over yet  
for the Capital Requirements Directive… 
Rym Ayadi* 
 
Following seven years of painstaking and 
demanding negotiations, European bankers and 
regulators breathed a sigh of relief when the 
Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) finally got 
through the European Parliament on 28 September 
2005, and was formally approved by the Council 
of Ministers of the 25 EU member states on 11 
October 2005. The new CRD will finally apply 
the complex, risk-sensitive Basel II capital 
adequacy rules to some 8,000 European banks 
and some 2,000 investments firms in two stages, 
the first in January 2007 and the second one year 
later.  
Several issues that will determine the successful 
implementation of the CRD are still on hold, 
however, and need to be looked at carefully. 
The future of comitology in the Directive, the 
impact of the new results of the fifth 
quantitative impact study for European 
institutions, the impact of the uneven 
implementation dates in the EU and the US and 
the purely European issues that were 
extensively addressed but only partially 
resolved pose real challenges for the European 
regulators and financial institutions.  
The latest developments in the CRD 
since its adoption 
The Capital Requirements Directive consists of 
re-casted versions of the codified banking 
Directive (2000/12/EC) and the capital adequacy 
Directive (93/6/EEC) and includes the package 
of  amendments related to the trading book 
activities.
1 It applies comitology to some 
provisions in the Directive. Since its adoption, 
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1 These rules were finalised by the IOSCO/Basel 
Committee joint working group on 18 July 2005. By 
then, the European Commission did not publish the last 
draft based on the changes agreed in July 2005. The new 
trading book rules were introduced into the CRD via an 
amending package adopted in the Plenary session on 28 
September 2005. 
the European Commission has published the final 
consolidated text on its website, containing some 800 
pages for regulating European credit institutions and 
investment firms.
2 Furthermore, it made accessible 
the conclusions of the impact study of the new 
operational risk charge for investment firms,
3 and 
formed a new transposition group
4 for the Directive, 
whose purpose is to clarify several issues in the new 
regulation. The new legislative text will be 
transposed into the national laws of the 25 member 
states when it is translated into the various national 
languages. 
The new CRD transposes the complex, risk-sensitive 
Basel II framework designed by the Basel Committee 
into EU law. All credit institutions and investment 
firms operating in the 25 member states will have to 
comply with the new Directive’s provisions from 
January 2007 onwards for the simple approach and 
from January 2008, for the more advanced approach 
to measuring credit and operational risks.  
The European regulators were determined to push the 
new regulation ahead, albeit under a cloud of 
uncertainties that called into question its timely 
adoption a few weeks before the voting of the 
Parliament.
5 The last-minute compromise reached 
between the three institutions and driven by the will 
and commitment of the Parliament to win its call-
back right under the comitology procedure saved the 
Directive from further delays in the process. This 
compromise amends Arts. 150 and 151 in the 
codified banking Directive (2000/12/EC) and Arts. 
42 and 43 in the re-casting of the capital adequacy 
Directive (93/6/EEC).
6 It means that the current 
                                                        
2 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/bank/ 
regcapital/index_en.htm#capitalrequire. 
3 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/bank/ 
regcapital/impact_en.htm#impact. 
4 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/bank/ 
regcapital/transposition_en.htm. 
5 See Rym Ayadi, The new capital requirements 
Directive: What pieces are still missing from the 
puzzle?, CEPS Policy Brief N° 82,September 2005. 
6 These articles set the rules to allow future amendments 
in some provisions (related to definitions’ adaptation, 
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comitology system
7 – which largely excludes the 
European Parliament – can be used to update and 
implement the CRD for a maximum of two years 
following the formal adoption of the new Directive 
(until 1 April 2008 at latest), after which time these 
powers may be renewed only with a new agreement 
of the three institutions. This new agreement will 
seek to revise the current comitology system used for 
such implementing provisions to establish the call-
back right for the Parliament.  
What’s next after the last-minute 
compromise on comitology? 
By suspending the comitology provisions in the CRD 
in July 2005, the European Parliament won the 
negotiations with the Commission and the Council 
with respect to the establishment of its call-back right 
under the comitology framework. That right will be 
reinstated after the two years following the adoption 
of the CRD.
8 Furthermore, by adding the new 
amendments to the related articles in the new 
Directive at the last minute, the Parliament put 
further pressure on the Commission and the Council 
to re-examine the current inter-institutional 
agreement – laying down the procedures for the 
exercise of implementing powers conferred on the 
Commission – before the end of the two-year sun-set 
clause following the adoption of the Directive. If a 
formal agreement between the three institutions that 
defines and secures the call-back right for the 
Parliament is not reached within the next two years,
9 
                                                                                       
technical adjustments in several articles and annexes) in 
the new Directive subject to comitology.  
7 Defined in the 1999 Council Decision (1999/468/EC) 
laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission.  
8 “Without prejudice to the implementing measures 
already adopted, upon expiry of a two year-period 
following the adoption of this Directive and on 1 April 
2008 at latest, the application of its provisions requiring 
the adoption of technical rules, amendments and 
decisions in accordance with paragraph 2 shall be 
suspended. Acting on a proposal from the Commission, 
the European Parliament and the Council may renew the 
provisions concerned in accordance with the procedure 
laid down in Article 251 of the Treaty and, to that end, 
they shall review them prior to the expiry of the period 
or the date referred to above.” Text introduced by the 
Parliament amending Art. 151 of recasting Directive 
2000/12/EC and Art. 43 of recasting Directive 
93/6/ECC.  
9 First, there should be an inter-institutional agreement 
on a clear definition of the ‘call-back right’ enjoyed by 
the Parliament. The Parliament requires that the call-
back right should include a clause of transparency, 
precisely the right to information when the EU 
Commission gives a mandate to the level 3 committees 
the comitology provisions in the CRD will be again 
put at risk,
10 and every change in the Directive will 
follow the lengthy traditional legislative co-decision 
process.  
This scenario is highly undesirable for three reasons: 
first, owing to the high level of the Directive’s 
technicality and the resulting importance to delegate 
some responsibility for the technical details to expert 
committees subject to oversight by the co-legislators; 
second, it is important to retain flexibility in the 
Directive since it has to be able to keep pace with 
developments in industry practices, markets and 
supervisory needs; and third, as one of the objectives 
of the Commission is to ensure enhanced 
convergence of regulatory and supervisory practices 
to help develop a single market, the role of the 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS) in this process is crucial. Putting the 
comitology provisions at risk will put a question 
mark over the future of CEBS’ role in the CRD.  
The fifth Quantitative Impact Study (QIS5) 
in Europe: A threat or a comfort? 
In September 2005, the Basel Committee announced 
its intention to conduct a QIS5 between October and 
December 2005, in order to review the calibration of 
the Basel II framework in spring 2006. The QIS5 will 
ensure that the envisaged review is based on the most 
recent, high-quality data and will evaluate the impact 
of the new proposals for the recognition of double 
default and trading book-related issues. At EU level, 
the Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS) will play a key role in the QIS5. The report 
that will analyse the results at EU level will be 
submitted to the EU Commission and to the 
European Banking Committee (EBC) as input for the 
discussion of possible amendments to the CRD.  
Presumably, the QIS5 will consider the changes 
based on the relative improvement in banks’ data 
series (more complete and robust default and loss-
severity data), and in the capital models as compared 
to the previous QIS3 conducted in year 2003. 
Further, the QIS5 will not only consider the impact of 
the changes relating to the move to unexpected losses 
                                                                                       
and the detailed work and progress of these committees 
with regular up-dates. This would help the Parliament to 
formulate well-founded opinions about matters under 
investigation. The three months foreseen by the current 
inter-institutional agreement may not suffice to build an 
opinion on complex matters in the CRD.          
10 In its new financial services strategy for the next five 
years; the Commission considered ensuring the right EU 
regulatory and supervisory structures as one of its main 
priorities.  http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/ 
finances/policy/index_en.htm  The game’s not over yet for the Capital Requirements Directive… | 3 
 
treatment, but also will consider assessing the impact 
of new trading book rules and the specific ‘EU 
measures’ on credit institutions and investment firms. 
However, because of the additional implementation 
work required until the end of 2006, there is still 
room for improvements. This would increase the 
importance of another impact study to take into 
account these improvements before the final 
recalibration. The recalibration will define a scaling 
factor (in the form of a multiplier), which ensures 
that the new framework will produce overall capital 
levels approximately equal to the current ones. 
The results of the QIS5, which are expected in the 
spring of 2006, will provide new and very important 
information that could be split into two possible 
scenarios. If the results would show an important 
material reduction in the minimum required capital 
for the population of EU institutions, with a 
significant amount of dispersion across institutions 
and across portfolios types, this should raise serious 
concerns among the European regulators and sensible 
solutions will have to be found. However, if the 
results are as uniform as the previous quantitative 
impact exercise, this would support the EU 
regulators’ choice to adopt the new banking 
regulation without further scrutiny.  
In the first-case scenario, international regulators may 
consider recalibrating the Accord with a high scaling 
factor necessary to lift the minimum capital 
requirements to the level that has historically ensured 
the safety of the financial system. Also, it could offer 
the means to correct Basel II limits since they does 
not account for interest rate and liquidity risks. 
Further, Basel II capital standards are based partly on 
the banks’ own data series and models. Data are 
based on estimates, and models are based on 
assumptions – both of which are subject to errors. 
However, such a crude correction might draw severe 
criticism from the industry because it will partially 
diminish the scope of a risk-based regulatory capital 
system and may be viewed as penalising adequately-
capitalised and well-managed banks. Building upon 
the emerging concepts of better and more risk-
sensitive regulation, the minimum Basel I capital 
level that was historically required could be 
challenged. Undoubtedly, while introducing a 
regulation that is more risk sensitive, it is hard to 
continue advocating the minimum capital level that is 
roughly determined. Herein lies a serious dilemma 
for international regulators: is it safe for the financial 
system to give up the minimum required capital level 
that served its purpose historically for the new levels 
that will be produced by the new risk-based 
regulation? 
What is the impact of staggered EU and US 
implementation schedules on European 
banks and supervisors? 
In  light of Basel II developments in Europe, it is 
important to examine the US decision that delays the 
publication and the implementation of the Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (NPR). The latter transposes 
Basel II rules into US legislation and ought to be 
applied to some 20 of the largest internationally 
active banks in the US. This cautious decision was 
the result of the worrying findings of the fourth 
quantitative impact study (QIS4), which showed an 
overall drop of regulatory capital requirements for the 
participating, internationally active US banks, with a 
high level of dispersion.
11 This drop was not 
anticipated by US supervisory agencies. As a 
response, they delayed the issuance of the NPR and 
introduced additional prudential safeguards in the 
legislation, while retaining the Prompt Corrective 
Action and leverage ratio requirements, to address 
concerns identified in the analysis of the results of 
QIS4. The implementation of the NPR is expected to 
be gradual, with the first opportunity for 
internationally active US banking institutions to 
conduct parallel runs in January 2008 and then being 
subject to a minimum three-year transition starting 
from January 2009 to January 2011. During this 
period, the agencies would apply limits or floors on 
the amounts, by which time each institution’s risk-
based capital could decline with the application of 
Basel II.
12 These floors are more conservative than 
those in the Basel II framework.  
 
The rest of the US banking system, composed of 
some 8,900 or more regional and community banks, 
will operate under the Basel IA proposals that would 
upgrade the current Basel I capital rules.
13 The 
                                                        
11 These results were not explained by differences in 
risks, but were rather attributed to the fact that internal 
banking systems are not all developing at the same pace, 
partly due to the lack of definitive rules and guidance. 
Consequently, it was not clear whether QIS4 results 
understate or overstate the minimum capital 
requirements.  
12 FDIC, “Banking agencies announce revised plan for 
implementation of Basel II framework”, press release, 
September 2005.  
13 Basel IA is an improved version of Basel I, and could 
be seen as the standardised approach of Basel II. Indeed, 
Basel IA allows: more granularity by increasing the 
number of risk weights, an expanded use of external risk 
ratings as indicators of credit risk, wider list of 
guarantees and collateral eligible, modified risk weights 
for residential mortgages and lower risk weights for 
certain small business loans. Also, Basel IA foresees a 
capital charge for certain securitisations with early 
amortisation provisions, higher risk weights for past due 4 | Rym Ayadi 
 
revision of the rules for these banks aims at reducing 
the material distortions that would occur while 
applying different rules. Also, it aims at maintaining 
a reasonable balance between risk sensitivity and 
operational feasibility.  
Because of staggered implementation dates, some 
commentators believed that European banks will 
benefit from a competitive advantage of 
implementing CRD in advance of their US 
counterparts. However, this is hard to believe since 
this competitive advantage is only temporary and is 
likely to be counterbalanced by the threat of 
additional compliance costs due to different 
implementation dates in the EU and the US. 
Moreover, the ambiguity of supervision on a solo 
basis versus a consolidated basis and the role of the 
lead supervisor for European banks operating in the 
US and US banks operating in the EU will be ever 
stronger. In practice, at least for one year, large 
European banks with substantial operations in the US 
will have to comply with Basel II rules in Europe and 
the current Basel I rules in the US and the reverse 
would hold for US banks with European operations, 
which will have to comply with Basel II in Europe 
and Basel I in the US. Internationally active banks 
represented by the Institute of International Finance 
have voiced their concern over the increased risk of 
competitive inequities and costly inefficiencies 
resulting from the uneven implementation of Basel II. 
In addition to these developments, internationally 
active banks will have to identify the problems 
arising from the uneven implementation of Basel II. 
To solve these problems and advance multilateral
14 
and bilateral
15 discussions, international regulators 
will have to cooperate and coordinate their efforts 
and actions in order to provide tangible, quick, 
pragmatic, efficient and workable solutions, 
particularly for complex banking groups.  
European issues extensively addressed 
but further scrutiny is needed to be fully 
solved…  
During the adoption process of the CRD, several 
issues have stimulated extensive debate between 
different interest groups. Although the related articles 
were adopted, these issues should be subject to 
further scrutiny in the future. These include:  
                                                                                       
loans, and high volatility commercial real estate and 
increased credit conversion factors for certain short-
term commitments.   
14 Those are fostered by the Accord Implementation 
Group (AIG). 
15 Bilateral discussions are considered to be an effective 
means to address cross-border issues.  
•  the level at which supervision is to apply – solo 
entity versus consolidated application (Art. 69 re-
casting 2000/12/CE); 
•  intra-group exposure (Art. 80(7) (re-casting 
2000/12/EC);  
•  the role of the lead supervisor (Art. 129 re-
casting 2000/12/EC); and  
•  the disclosure of ratings to loan applicants (Art. 
145 (3) re-casting 2000/12/EC).  
With regard to the level of application, changes made 
by Parliament and agreed upon by the Council allow 
under very strict conditions the supervision of 
national subsidiaries on a consolidated basis. These 
changes also allow, under similarly strict conditions 
and with additional disclosure requirements, 
supervisors to waive the solo requirement for parent 
undertakings. Waiving the solo requirement for 
subsidiaries and parent undertaking in the same 
member state will certainly favour credit institutions 
operating nationally as opposed to those operating 
across borders. Indeed, if all conditions are satisfied, 
the former will be supervised on a consolidated basis, 
whereas the latter will have to comply with all 
requirements on an individual and a consolidated 
basis.  
Also, thanks to the backing of the Parliament and the 
Council, it was made possible to extend the zero risk-
weighting for intra-group exposures to banks 
operating within an institutional protection scheme 
(Art. 87 (7a)) under more lenient conditions as 
compared to the requirements originally imposed by 
the Commission on the other types of banks. These 
conditions may not be sufficient to qualify as a single 
unit for prudential purposes.  
In view of these two developments, if one of the main 
objectives of the new Directive is presumably to 
ensure the level playing field between institutions 
performing the same activities and bearing the same 
risks, it is expected that they are treated equivalently.  
Further, Parliament backed a partial role of the lead 
supervisor usually based in the home country of the 
bank, with respect to the validation and final shape of 
internal rating-based and advanced measurement 
models for credit and operational risks. This is only 
one step forward towards a full lead supervisor 
regime and would risk undesirable inconsistencies in 
implementation since this concept is not extended to 
pillar 2 and pillar 3. It would also risk the creation of 
asymmetries with respect to the responsibilities and 
burdens borne by home and host country supervisors. 
In this context, the question is how to solve a 
situation where a home and a host do not agree on the 
model’s validation within the six-month period 
foreseen by the Directive and during which time the 
host has to be accountable to local taxpayers when a The game’s not over yet for the Capital Requirements Directive… | 5 
 
given subsidiary is in distress. At the same time, a 
full lead supervisor regime may not be sustainable 
unless there is a binding agreement between the 
home and the host supervisors with respect to the 
issues of deposit guarantee schemes, lender of last 
resort and reorganisation and winding up.  
Finally, banks will have to explain their rating 
decisions to SMEs and other corporate applicants for 
loans if they so request. Art. 145 (3a) in the final text 
suggests, in a rather threatening tone, that if a 
“voluntary undertaking” fails to achieve an adequate 
level of transparency between loan applicants and 
banks regarding the rating decision, national 
measures should be taken. However, nothing is said 
about the format and the content of the rating 
decision, the criteria to define the adequacy of the 
voluntary undertaking of the sector or what national 
measures would be taken if these undertakings prove 
inadequate. 
Key factors to ensure successful 
implementation in Europe 
To ensure a successful implementation in the 25 
member states, the new Directive should benefit from 
the comitology provisions during the two-year sunset 
clause foreseen by the Parliament. These provisions 
must be extended in light of a formal inter-
institutional agreement that reforms the current one in 
the next two years to define and establish the call-
back right for the Parliament. This is crucial for 
allowing flexible updates and changes related to the 
continuous development in market practices. The 
related role of the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors (CEBS) is key to ensuring a consistent 
and coherent implementation and application of EU 
banking regulation in all member states.  
Two very important issues arose further in the US 
supervisory agencies’ decision to delay the 
implementation date of the advanced approach of 
Basel II in Europe from January 2008 to January 
2009. Most importantly, one should give more 
attention to the likely impact of the new rules on 
banks and investment firms on the one hand and on 
financial stability on the other. The results of a new 
quantitative impact study are keenly anticipated, not 
only to add comfort and reassurance with respect to 
the challenging approach taken by European 
regulators, but also to take the necessary measures on 
time in the event that similar results occur in the US. 
Staggered implementation of timetables across the 
Atlantic are neither welcomed by internationally 
active banks nor appreciated by national regulators. 
For the former, this would increase the compliance 
burden which leads to inefficiencies. For the latter, 
this would render their tasks more burdensome. 
Relying only on bilateral and/or multilateral dialogue 
to solve the heightened cross-border matters may not 
suffice to reach a quick and workable solution. 
Undoubtedly, the implementation of the new rules 
will be much more difficult to handle in these 
circumstances; however, the difficulties are not 
insuperable if both sides of the Atlantic are 
commitment to cooperate in finding quick, pragmatic 
and workable solutions.   
With respect to the purely European issues, owing to 
the evolving nature of banking regulation and 
supervision, it is fundamental to prepare the 
foundation for a more integrated financial market. 
Ensuring that the lead-supervisor concept functions 
well in general and in the context of the CRD in 
particular is vital. Efforts in this direction would also 
solve the issues related to the levels of application – 
whether banking supervision can be conducted at a 
consolidated level nationally or across borders or 
whether banks and their subsidiaries are to be 
supervised as solo entities in the medium term while 
seeking other arrangements in the direction of 
complete supervision at a consolidated level.  
In addition, providing the conditions for a level 
playing field is one of the chief objectives in the 
development of new banking regulation. Therefore, it 
is important to treat entities that perform the same 
activities in an equivalent way so as not to undermine 
this principle.  
Finally, provisions in the CRD that promote 
transparency and better communication between 
SMEs and their lenders are appreciated. This could 
be achieved through a non-legislative code of 
conduct, which sets out the main principles 
governing this growing SME-banking relationship 
and also the details of the minimum requirements for 
the disclosed elements in the rating process.  
The new CRD is a revolution in prudential 
supervision, not only for EU financial institutions but 
also for EU supervisors, and their respective tasks are 
challenging. Putting all the key elements together – 
comprehensible legislation, adequate and flexible 
means for updating it and a continuous impartial 
dialogue with the interested parties, together with 
effective cooperation and coordination in the most 
sensitive matters – will lay a firm cornerstone to 
successful implementation. C  E 
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